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LEGISLATIVE VOTING: 
INFLUENCES ON ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Krystyna Zwolinski 
 
Abstract 
 The question of what prompts legislators to vote as they do has long been the subject of 
much empirical political research. This research project contributes to this body of literature by 
addressing the question of what factors influence how members of Congress vote on 
environmental issues. More specifically, I examine how a combination of personal and 
constituency characteristics influence the level of environmental support of members of the 
House of Representatives in the years 2003 through 2006. The personal characteristics of the 
representatives examined are gender, party, and seniority; the constituency characteristics are 
region, urbanicity, occupation, education, and district ideology.  
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“Coming into existence around 1960 along with a number of other movements for social 
and political change, the U.S. environmental movement has arguably been one of the 
most successful movements of the 20th century – effecting mass cultural and political 
change” (Agnone 2007). 
 
Introduction 
It is unlikely that someone today is unaware of the debates on different environmental 
issues; the movement to “Go Green” has recently captured the attention of many prominent news 
stations and programs. Though it may be hard to imagine, such discussion was not always so 
prominent. It took several events in the 1960s to truly draw the nation’s attention to the condition 
of the environment. Since then, however, environmental issues “have been the subject of regular 
congressional attention” (Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
 President Richard Nixon played a significant role in the environmental movement. On 
January 1, 1970, he signed the National Environmental Policy Act and stated that “The 1970s 
absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the past by reclaiming the purity of 
its air, its water, and our living environment. It is literally now or never” (Smith 2000). A few 
months later, on April 22, millions in the United States celebrated the first Earth Day (Smith 
2000). More importantly, in the following years, membership in many environmental 
organizations began to increase: “From 1968 to 1972 the membership in many organizations, 
including the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, and the 
National Wildlife Federation, increased dramatically, doubling and in some cases tripling” 
(Smith 2000). Such organizations also became more professional, a change reflected in their 
larger and more specialized staffs (Coglianese 2001). In addition, the environmental movement, 
which had originally relied on “protest tactics,” turned to “traditional insider political strategies” 
(Coglianese 2001); as the public became more concerned about environmental protection, so did 
politicians. 
Congress’ “historical role in the formation of environmental policy has been both highly 
influential and unquestionably responsive to the American public’s concern over environmental 
degradation” (Kraft 1995). In his study, Michael S. Pulia found that in general, “the government, 
as elected representatives of the people, is actually attentive to changing public opinion” (Pulia 
1998). Jon Agnone found that this holds true with environmental legislation. An examination of 
congressional representation, of what Agnone refers to as “policy responsiveness,” provides 
insight as to why this is the case (2007). 
 
Previous Research 
 For years, the complex workings of Congress have fascinated political scientists. 
Designed to be the more representative of the two chambers, the House of Representatives has 
especially attracted attention, as scholars have sought to determine just how responsive members 
are to their constituents. 
 According to John Kingdon, one of the most recognized among Congressional scholars, 
Congressional “decisions are affected primarily by the legislators’ own policy attitudes and by 
their constituencies” (Kingdon 1989). Similarly, Greg Crowe and Elizabeth Ann Eberspacher 
found that two of the strongest influences on congressional votes are “party ties and constituency 
interests” (Crowe & Eberspacher 1998). Erikson and Wright (1992) reported that House 
members will vote according to the ideology of their constituencies, even if this requires 
deviating from their party (Crowe & Eberspacher 1998). 
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Although constituency does not provide a complete explanation for legislators’ votes, it 
certainly plays an important role. This is not surprising, for constituency is “the only actor in the 
political system to which the congressman is ultimately accountable” (Kingdon 1989). 
 
 
Mechanisms of Constituent Influence 
Kingdon defined four main mechanisms by which constituents exert influence over their 
legislators: recruitment, explaining, direct communication, and electoral consequences. 
Recruitment, the simplest of the four mechanisms, is the initial election of an individual 
to office. Perhaps the easiest way to ensure that one’s opinions are represented in Congress is to 
elect someone who has the same values. Although this is not just the responsibility of the mass 
public (elites such as “party activists, campaign contributors, interest group leaders” and others 
also play a significant role), this mechanism probably explains the most variance in legislative 
voting (Kingdon 1989). 
 While not all constituents closely monitor the activities of their representatives, those 
who do often expect an explanation of why a legislator voted the way he did on a particular 
issue. Representatives must be prepared to justify their votes. If a legislator feels he will be 
unable to provide a sufficient explanation, he may find it easier just to vote according to his 
constituents. However, the intensity with which the legislator holds his own opinion on the issue 
is also a factor in deciding how he casts his vote. He may prefer to use his best judgment and rely 
on being able to justify his decision to his constituents later. This is certainly a more subtle and 
indirect mechanism than recruitment, yet it is nonetheless important. 
 The most direct mechanism of influence is communication with a legislator. It can be a 
very effective “attention-focusing agent” (Kingdon 1989). There are three roles such 
communication can play: alerting a representative to an issue of which he was previously 
unaware, indicating to him that an issue is more important to his constituents than he had 
thought, or simply indicating on which side of the issue most of his constituents’ preferences lie. 
Such communication can be through mail, email, responses to questionnaires sent out by 
congressmen, or conversations in person or over the telephone. 
 The fourth mechanism, the “classic enforcement of constituency control,” is electoral 
consequences (Kingdon 1989). This mechanism is enacted by constituents through retribution, 
through casting fewer votes for a particular congressman, sometimes even by removing him from 
office. To see the influence of this mechanism, one needs only simply observe which issues a 
congressman chooses to focus on when campaigning (and thus pays more attention to). One of 
the precautions legislators take against the uncertainties of elections is to “take some account of 
the district as the vote, especially on more salient issues” (Kingdon 1989). 
 
 
Congressmen and Elections 
 Much of the literature on Congress discusses legislators’ desire for reelection. Zachary A. 
Smith reported that “most analysts have concluded reelection is a primary motive for legislative 
behavior” (Smith 2000). For this reason, and because legislators who respond to any of these 
mechanisms presumably do so in order to keep their seat, one logical approach to the discussion 
of Congress is from the electoral angle. Thus, legislators are expected to behave in such a 
manner as to portray themselves favorably to voters. 
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Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) provided this analogy: “‘politicians are keen to 
pick up on the faintest signals in their political environment. Like antelope in an open field, they 
cock their ears and focus their full attention on the slightest sign of danger’” (Maravall 1999). 
The House was designed “to be the popular branch of government” and “elections for the 
House were expected to reflect the ebb and flow of public preferences” (Erikson & Wright 
1997). Representatives are elected by popular vote in their districts, thus they are directly 
responsible to their constituents. The preoccupation of many legislators with the biennial 
elections provides great incentive to vote according to their constituents’ wishes. Because 
constituents tend to “reward faithful representation…[those] generally desirous of attaining and 
staying in office, heed their electorate’s wishes and work to give them what they want” (Erikson 
& Wright 1997). Albeit a bit dated, in his study Kingdon found that “if a congressman perceives 
a constituency position on any given issue, the probability that he will vote according to that 
position is .76,” and the “correlation between the perceived constituency position and the 
congressman’s vote is .49” (1989). 
How well candidates (especially incumbents) do at the polls is partially determined by 
the stances they take on issues (Erikson & Wright 1997). Thus it is not surprising that, as Arnold 
(1990) explained, “legislators choose among policy proposals by estimating citizens’ preferences 
weighted for the possibility that constituents will use these decisions as voting cues in the next 
election” (Bishin 2000). More importantly, Evan J. Ringquist and Carl Dasse reported that 
“contrary to public perceptions, candidates for Congress routinely act to keep their campaign 
promises once elected, at least in the area of environmental protection policy” (Ringquist & 
Dasse 2004). Kingdon found no significant difference between legislators in competitive versus 
safe districts in terms of their likelihood to cater to their constituents’ wishes. Perhaps the reason 
safe districts are safe and that the incumbency advantage exists is because the incumbent has 
consistently voted according to his constituents’ preferences (Kingdon 1989). Clearly, legislators 
value their constituents’ opinions. 
Constituency Elites 
 Although not the focus of this project, it is important to note that “the presence of elites in 
the congressman’s perceptual map of his constituency…considerably enhances the importance of 
the constituency in his decision” (Kingdon 1989). Kingdon identified two types: policy and 
process elites. Policy elites are individuals with “a direct expertise or interest in the government 
policy at issue,” while process elites, though they do not have a direct interest in a particular 
policy, play an important role in “the more general political process” (Kingdon 1989). These 
include newspaper editors or party activists, among others. Policy elites typically draw more 
congressional attention than process elites, but both can be influential. 
 Due to their special status among the masses, in addition to attracting the attention of the 
legislators, elites also help draw the public’s focus to certain issues. In 1999, Jun Yin conducted 
a study on the specific relationship between elite and public environmental attitudes and found 
that the attitudes of elites had a great influence on the attitudes of the public (Yin 1999). Kara 
Lindaman and Donald P. Haider-Markel reported similar findings in their study (Lindaman & 
Haider-Markel 2002). Elite participation is often a determining factor in the salience of an issue 
– issues are not generally regarded as highly salient without elite involvement. This is important 
because even though legislators do generally vote according to their constituents’ wishes, they 
are much more likely to do so with high-salience issues (Kingdon 1989). 
Legislative Voting: Two Main Themes 
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The majority of existing literature on legislative voting examines one of two themes. The 
first, traditionally the focus of political economists, is “the role of a legislator’s personal ideology 
as an influence on his or her decisions,” in which scholars examine “the relative effects of 
legislator ideology and constituent economic interests” (Bishin 2000) The second, more 
traditional, focus of political science research is “the relative influence of personal and 
constituent preferences” on the decisions of legislators (Bishin 2000). This project contributes to 
traditional research, for it investigates the combined role that personal and constituent 
characteristics play in determining a legislator’s vote on environmental issues. 
 
Goals of this Study 
 While this study specifically seeks to explore environmental issues in Congress, the 
general goal is to explore characteristics that correlate with higher environmental support among 
citizens. Armed with the results, it is hoped that environmentalists can better focus their efforts, 
especially when trying to recruit individuals to join their movement. If it is found that individuals 
with certain characteristics are already more likely to show greater support, time and resources 
can be invested in those who may not be as environmentally literate. 
While environmental issues catapulted to the forefront of most Americans’ minds in the 
1970s, the salience of the issue has undeniably waned since then. Coglianese discussed this 
phenomenon, noting that “in the absence of crises, environmentalism does not motivate the 
political behavior of any large segment of the public” (Coglianese 2001). Moreover, while 
Americans generally remain highly supportive of environmental protection, they do not typically 
cast their votes based on environmental issues (Coglianese 2001). As congressmen enter office 
well aware of this, it will be interesting to determine the implications for the democratic process 
of representation. 
 
Inspiration for this Project 
In 2001, Charles R. Shipan and William R. Lowry published a study in which they 
examined whether the two parties had diverged or converged on environmental policy over a 
period of thirty years and the factors contributing to this movement. They examined the effects 
of region (the influence of southern democrats), factions (interest group activity, issue salience, 
and economic conditions), individuals (the number of freshmen each year), and ideology (as a 
control variable). At the end of their study one of the questions posed for future research, and 
consequently the foundation of this project, was: What kinds of characteristics of different 
congressional districts are consistent with higher or lower League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 
scores? 
Thus, Shipan and Lowry’s work was the model for the structuring of this research 
project. 
 
Research Question 
 In examining what influences congressmen to vote as they do on environmental issues, 
the specific question this project seeks to answer is: What characteristics of representatives and 
their constituencies influence their voting on environmental issues, as measured by the League of 
Conservation Voters scores in the House of Representatives from 2003 through 2006? 
 The literature on legislative voting shows overwhelmingly that members of Congress do 
respond to their constituents. For this reason, in this study it is assumed that, with respect to 
environmental issues, legislators’ votes will correspond to their constituents’ preferences.   
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Data for all variables with the exception of two will be collected from the Almanac of 
American Politics, 2004 and 2006. The district education statistics will be gathered from Politics 
in America, 2006, and the LCV scores will be collected from the LCV’s website. 
 
League of Conservation Voters 
 The League of Conservation Voters is a nonprofit organization and very powerful interest 
group. Founded in 1970, in conjunction with the first Earth Day, its mission is to “advocate for 
sound environmental policies and to elect pro-environmental candidates who will adopt and 
implement such policies” (“League of Conservation Voters” 2007). It is “the political voice for 
over nine million members of environmental and conservation organizations and the only 
organization working full-time to educate citizens about the environmental voting records of 
Members of Congress” (“League of Conservation Voters” 2007). One of the means the LCV 
uses to present information about congressmen’s environmental support is the National 
Environmental Scorecard, which it creates after each session of Congress. 
 To create the Scorecard, experts from different environmental organizations select “the 
key votes on which Members of Congress should be graded” (“League of Conservation Voters” 
2007). In the years included in this study, the number of key votes each year ranged from 19 to 
more than 20.1 For each key vote, it is recorded whether or not each legislator’s vote was “pro-
environmental” as defined by the experts. The total number of pro-environmental votes is then 
converted to a percentage, which is the environmental score of each representative. Scores range 
from 0 to 100, with higher scores corresponding to higher environmentalist attitudes. 
 
Operationalization of the Dependent Variable 
In order to measure congressional support for environmental policy, Shipan and Lowry 
used League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores. With only a slight difference, the same 
method will be employed for this study. Shipan and Lowry had to use adjusted LCV scores in 
their study to make them comparable between the two chambers over the thirty years they 
examined. Because this project only focuses on the House and a three-year period, the raw scores 
will be used; no adjustments are necessary. 
It is not uncommon for researchers to measure environmental voting using LCV scores. 
As is the case with scorecards from any organization, however, “they may conceal several issue 
dimensions and may not differentiate as much as desirable between qualitatively different votes 
(e.g., their policy significance)” (Kraft 1995). Shipan and Lowry also acknowledged that the 
“reliability of using voting scores to measure congressional preferences has been the subject of 
considerable discussion” (Shipan & Lowry 2001); however, “at least at first glance, the LCV 
scores have some validity,” and consistently match what would be expected from certain 
representatives (Shipan & Lowry 2001). More importantly, LCV scores “are widely cited and 
recognized as providing useful measures of congressional behavior” (Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
Thus, although not perfect, the National Environmental Scorecard provides a satisfactory and 
sufficient measure of legislators’ pro-environmental behavior.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The number of key votes in each year was as follows: 20 (2003), 19 (2004), 20 (2005), more than 20 (2006). For 
more information, including discussions on the key issues for each year, refer to the organization’s website: 
http://www.lcv.org. 
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Theoretical Expectations 
Once again, this project seeks to examine the influence of both personal and constituency 
characteristics on legislative voting behavior. The representatives’ personal characteristics 
examined are gender, party, and seniority, while those of the constituency are region, urbanicity, 
occupation, education, and district ideology. A study by Gene L. Theodori and A. E. Luloff 
found that individuals with different views on the environment also had different 
sociodemographic characteristics (Theodori & Luloff 2002). This study examines some of those 
same characteristics as well as a few others. 
Among the existing literature on the correlation between each of these variables and 
environmental support, one frequently cited study is that published by Kent D. Van Liere and 
Riley E. Dunlap in 1980. The authors conducted “an evaluation of existing knowledge regarding 
the social bases of public concern with environmental quality” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). 
Although a bit dated, their well-renowned publication contains very useful information on 
several of the independent variables in this study. A review of the work of other political 
scientists provides supplementary and additional support for the following theoretical 
expectations.  
Gender 
 At the time of Van Liere and Dunlap’s study, there existed only a limited amount of 
research on the correlation between gender and environmental attitudes. Moreover, the studies 
the authors reviewed offered conflicting results, leaving the authors unable to make any 
conclusive statements about gender and the environment. 
To begin, Van Liere and Dunlap (1978) found a modest correlation between being female 
and being more environmentally-supportive, while both McEvoy (1972) and Arbuthnot and 
Lingg (1975) found the exact opposite (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Other studies found 
correlations that were not statistically significant. Based on this evidence, Van Liere and Dunlap, 
albeit tentatively, concluded that “sex is not substantially associated with environmental 
concern” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). 
This has been the overall trend in research conducted since. In her 2001 study, Bernadette 
C. Hayes found that if at all, women are only modestly more concerned than men. Any recorded 
gender differences were “highly contingent on the particular type of environmental risk concern 
examined,” and moreover, “in the vast majority of cases an additional qualifying factor” was 
required (Hayes 2001). Similarly, while Theodori and Luloff found gender to have a statistically 
significant correlation with environmentalist attitudes, they concluded that the relationship was 
not clear-cut (Theodori & Luloff 2002). Although women are stereotypically seen as more 
compassionate and nurturing than men and thus often expected to have higher environmentalist 
attitudes, previous research finds data on the relationship between gender and environmental 
support inconclusive. 
 Operationalization:  Each representative will be coded according to gender, males as 1  
                     and females as 0. 
 Hypothesis 1:  Despite stereotypes to the contrary, gender will not have a statistically  
          significant effect upon environmental voting. 
 
Political Party  
Aage Clausen, well-known for his research on political parties, found party to be the most 
significant factor in congressional voting (Clausen 1978). Many political scientists since have 
also reported that party is “the most important factor in explaining congressional voting 
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behavior” (Ringquist 2004). Clausen insisted that party can only be used to successfully predict 
votes relating to certain policy areas. However, the area in which it can most be relied on is 
government management, an area under which environmental regulation falls (Clausen 1978). 
As Shipan and Lowry found, however, the role that party has played in environmental voting in 
Congress has changed over time (Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
At first, “politicians from every political persuasion claimed to be in favor of protecting 
the environment” (Smith 2000). Sheldon Kamieniecki found that early studies “maintain that, 
like ‘motherhood and apple pie,’ environmental issues are ‘consensus issues’” (Kamieniecki 
1995). Citing Ogden (1971), Van Liere and Dunlap explained that many thought this issue 
transcended the partisan divide because of the “rapid rise of widespread public support for 
environmental reform in the late sixties and early seventies” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Sean 
M. Theriault found, however, that in general, the parties “are, indeed, more polarized now than 
they were in the early 1970s” (Theriault 2006). Their support of environmental policies has 
followed this trend. 
This partisan polarization over the environment was the focus of Shipan and Lowry’s 
study. As expected, they found that “the two parties clearly differ on environmental support 
scores,” and, more interestingly, that the scores have become more polarized with the passage of 
time (Shipan & Lowry 2001). Since the 1970s, not only have Democrats become more 
environmentally pro-active, but Republicans have actually become less so.  
Democrats are generally expected to be more supportive of the environment than 
Republicans; there are several possible explanations for this. As Dunlap (1975) pointed out, “(1) 
environmental reforms generally are opposed by business and industry because of the costs 
involved, (2) environmental reforms entail an extension of government activities and regulations, 
and (3) environmental reforms often require innovative action” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). 
Republicans are traditionally known to favor business, oppose big government, and be wary of 
drastic change; thus, it is reasonable to expect them to be less supportive of environmental 
policies than Democrats (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). In addition, financial support always 
influences votes and Kamieniecki found that Republicans often are supported by “large 
corporations and polluting firms,” while Democrats receive their support from environmental 
groups (Kamieniecki 1995). 
Shipan and Lowry turned to the influence of interest groups as another possible 
explanation. “Interest groups can supply resources, information, and electoral support;” they can 
be very influential (Shipan & Lowry 2001). Therefore, since “environmental groups have 
become more explicitly aligned with Democrats,” while “members of the Republican party have 
received growing support from private property groups,” it is logical to expect Democrats’ votes 
to be more environmentally-friendly (Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
Operationalization:  Democrats will be coded as 1 and Republicans as 0. 
Hypothesis 2: Democrats are more likely to support environmental activism than  
           Republicans. 
 
Seniority 
An interesting factor in congressional voting is seniority – the number of years’ 
experience a legislator has in office.  Traditionally, referring to the member replacement theory, 
researchers have suggested that “incumbents are more risk-averse and thus hesitant to pursue 
new policy positions over time,” while challengers, on the other hand, “are free to choose more 
extreme positions” (Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
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In his study, Theriault examined the roles of both member replacement and member 
adaptation in the general polarization of the parties. Theriault found evidence that the 
polarization can be at least partially attributed to members being replaced by more ideologically 
extreme individuals; however, he also drew attention to the role played by member adaptation. 
Adaptation, which “occurs when particular legislators become more conservative or liberal over 
the course of their career,” he found, “accounts for one-third of the polarization between the 
parties since 1973” (Theriault 2006). However, the evidence on member adaptation has not 
always been consistent, and “more recent studies of polarization downplay [its] role” (Theriault 
2006). 
After reviewing the work of other scholars, Theriault noted that some, such as Poole and 
Rosenthal, suggested that “members of Congress vote consistently throughout their careers” 
(2006). Theriault, in contrast, found support for member adaptation; he found it to be 
“responsible for 35 percent of the polarization in the House” since 1973 (2006). He noted, 
however, that “actual individual member adaptations are miniscule” and that some members 
actually become more moderate with time (Theriault 2006). Moreover, member adaptation 
explains less of the party divergence than does member replacement. 
Shipan and Lowry also examined this issue and found a positive correlation between 
freshmen and partisan divergence. Specifically in reference to the House, they observed that 
“higher numbers of freshmen lead to wider divergence on environmental voting, a strong 
indicator of the effect of replacement and consistent with our earlier finding that new members, 
particularly in the Democratic party, do tend to take more extreme positions on these issues” 
(Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
Operationalization: This variable will be measured by the total number of terms that each  
        member has served in Congress, including the present. 
Hypothesis 3: It is expected that newer representatives will be more polarized by party  
           than those who have served for a greater length of time.  The newest     
           Democratic members will be the most supportive of environmental  
           legislation, while the newest Republican members will be the least  
           supportive. 
 
Region 
 Kraft, in reviewing previous literature, reported that studies consistently found 
southerners to show the least amount of environmental support (Kraft 1995). Conrad L. Kanagy 
and Hart M. Nelsen noted that despite being “less likely than nonsoutherners to support 
additional federal spending for the environment,” those in the South “are no more likely…to 
argue that environmental regulations should be weakened” (Kanagy & Nelsen 1995). Regardless 
of this interesting stipulation, however, Shipan and Lowry found that in general, “the region least 
sympathetic to environmental causes is the south” (Shipan & Lowry 2001). 
 Previous research overwhelmingly indicates that the South is least supportive of 
environmental reform. Kamieniecki, however, dug deeper. The results of his study indicate that 
those in the South and intermountain West show less support than those along the Pacific coast 
and in the Northeast (Ringquist 2004). His findings are consistent with and more specific than 
those of other researchers. 
 Operationalization: For this variable, the country will be divided into the intermountain  
West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, and Wyoming), South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
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Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and  Virginia), and everything else. 
Districts in the South and intermountain West will be coded as 1 and 
all others will be coded as 0. Therefore, there will be two dummy 
variables for region. 
Hypothesis 4: Representatives from districts in the intermountain West and South will  
           have significantly lower environmental scores than representatives from  
           districts throughout the rest of the country. 
 
Urbanicity 
 Researchers have generally found that urban residents are more likely to be 
environmentally supportive than rural residents. William R. Freudenburg and Barbara McGinn 
suggested that the apparent relationship between urban residence and greater environmental 
concern may actually exist only at the local, rather than the state or national level (Freudenburg 
& McGinn 1987). They also discussed the possibility that lower levels of environmental concern 
among rural residents may actually be attributable to the presence of farmers, rather than to the 
rural population as a whole (Freudenburg & McGinn 1987). Without any qualifications though, 
Frederick H. Buttel found that urban residence consistently, albeit not strongly, predicted greater 
environmental support (Buttel 1987). Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) and Kraft (1995), among 
others, also found that the evidence generally indicates that urban residents show greater 
environmental concern than rural residents. 
There are several different theories as to why urban residents show more environmental 
support. The first of these, offered by Tremblay and Dunlap (1978), is based upon surroundings. 
Because urban residents “generally are exposed to higher levels of pollution and other types of 
environmental deterioration,” it is reasonable to expect them to have higher pro-environmental 
attitudes (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). The authors also offered a utilitarian theory, explaining 
that because rural residents tend to have “‘extractive’ occupations such as farming, logging, and 
mining,” their priority is more likely to be the exploitation, rather than the protection, of the 
environment (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Acknowledging that not all rural residents have 
“extractive occupations,” due to a “shared rural culture,” the authors still maintained this group 
as a whole is less concerned with environmental protection (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). 
Murdock and Schriner (1977) presented a third theory, one based on the growth orientation of 
rural residents. According to this theory, rural and small-town residents “value [economic] 
growth over protection of environmental quality,” because “small towns need to maintain 
economic growth to survive” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Despite the various explanations 
offered, the research trend indicates that urban residents are more environmentally conscientious 
than their rural neighbors.  
 Operationalization: The percentage of the district classified as urban will be used as the  
        measure of this variable. 
Hypothesis 5:  The greater the level of urbanicity in a district, the higher the  
            environmental score the representative will have. 
 
Occupation    
 In 1979, Jerry W. Calvert found greater environmental support among individuals with 
white-collar occupations than others (Calvert 19798). One year later, Van Liere and Dunlap 
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reported that while “a majority of the associations between occupational prestige and 
environmental concern…are positive,” most are only slight associations (1980). 
Although there is not a great wealth of research on the specific correlation between 
occupation and environmentalism, it is often assumed that individuals with blue-collar jobs are 
less concerned about the environment than those with more “prestigious” jobs. Van Liere and 
Dunlap, assuming occupational prestige to correlate with social class, reviewed a few 
explanations for this. One explanation, presented by Dunlap et. al. (1975), is based on Maslow’s 
(1970) hierarchy of needs theory. This explanation suggests that “the upper and middle classes 
have solved their basic material needs and thus are free to focus on the more aesthetic aspects of 
human existence,” such as the environment (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). Another possible 
explanation, offered by Morrison et. al. (1972) is that of relative deprivation. According to this 
explanation, “members of the lower class typically have experienced only poor physical 
conditions, and thus are less aware that they live, work, and play in polluted, overcrowded 
conditions” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980); they are not expected to push for what they have not 
experienced. A third explanation, presented by Martinson and Wilkening (1975) and Althoff and 
Greig (1977), is that those in the middle and upper classes are more “politically and socially 
active” than those in the lower and working classes; therefore, “their concern over environmental 
problems is only an extension of a generalized concern with social problems” (Van Liere & 
Dunlap 1980). 
 Interestingly, Buttel and Flinn (1978) predicted the exact opposite. The authors expected 
the lower and working classes to be more concerned about environmental issues because they 
“typically reside in highly polluted areas, work in poor physical environments, and have access 
to poor recreational facilities” (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). 
 The fact that uncertainty surrounds this variable could stem from the fact that the 
relationship between labor unions/members of the working class and environmentalists has 
changed over time. Scott Dewey thoroughly investigated this relationship. He found that labor 
unions originally played a very important role in the environmentalist movement. In fact, many 
union members “preceded most of the rest of the environmental movement in conceptually 
linking environmental problems with wider social and economic issues” (Dewey 1998). Labor 
unions retained their environmentalist attitudes until the 1970s, which saw the “growing energy 
crisis…the onset of chronic stagflation, the pressure of foreign competition, and other economic 
and social stresses” (Dewey 1998). Once believing that jobs and economic growth could be 
preserved at the same time the environment was cleaned up, as economic conditions worsened, 
workers “grew increasingly receptive to the industry-promoted argument that the nation could 
not afford the luxury of environmentalism” (Dewey 1998). Thus developed the popular “myth 
that organized labor and the environmental movement were inevitably opposed to one another” 
(Dewey 1998). 
On the other hand, Cary Coglianese found that as “the values of environmentalism began 
to diffuse throughout society,” among those who captured them were unions (2001). “Business 
even began to espouse green values” (Coglianese 2001). Despite these findings and the fact that 
many businesses today are making visible efforts to be more sustainable, the myth that labor 
unions and environmentalists are fundamentally at odds still persists. 
Although only supported by stereotypes and a minimal collection of empirical data, 
evidence tends to indicate that a more prestigious job correlates with a higher pro-environmental 
attitude. 
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Operationalization: As a measure of occupation, the percentage of constituents classified  
       as blue-collar workers will be used. 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the percentage of blue-collar workers in a district, the less  
           supportive of environmental policy the representative will be. 
 
Education     
  Citing Dillman and Christenson (1972), Calvert found that those with better educations 
are more likely to support environmental policies (Calvert 1979). Van Liere and Dunlap also 
found previous research to show an association, albeit only a moderate one, between higher 
education and greater environmental concern (1980). Similarly, Buttel found higher education 
consistently and moderately associated with a positive environmental attitude (Buttel 1987). His 
results are consistent with both earlier and later research. 
 Kanagy and Nelsen gauged environmental support through both individuals’ feelings 
towards increased federal spending as well as towards relaxed environmental controls. Their 
results show that while the better-educated are no more likely to support increased spending, 
they are significantly more likely to oppose relaxation of controls, indicating that they have 
higher pro-environmental attitudes than those with less education (Kanagy & Nelsen 1995). 
Similarly, in their study, Theodori and Luloff found a linear and statistically significant 
relationship between education and environmental attitude. They concluded that individuals who 
are “more highly educated…are more likely than their opposites to maintain proactive positions 
on environmental issues” (Theodori & Luloff 2002). Julian Keniry provided interesting insight 
as to why this may be. 
 According to Keniry, “one of the more astounding phenomena in higher education today 
is the number of environmental organizations that have sprung up in recent years” (1993). In 
addition, “the environment consistently ranks high among today’s student concerns” (Keniry 
1993).  In 1990, “college environmental outreach programs” were organized by the groups 
National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Earth Day 1990, and the Student Environmental Action 
Coalition (SEAC) (Keniry 1993). Since then, other groups have begun to design college 
environmental programs as part of an effort to institutionalize the environmental movement on 
college campuses. Colleges are making their own efforts as well, through a combination of 
student organizations, incorporation of environmental themes into the curriculum, and 
environmental planning done either by a task force or a liaison between students, faculty, and 
members of the administration (Keniry 1993). Therefore, as an increasing number of college 
students are exposed to these issues, it is reasonable to expect college graduates to exhibit higher 
environmentally-friendly attitudes. 
 Operationalization: Education will be measured by the percentage of constituents with a  
       college education. 
Hypothesis 7: The more educated the constituents, the higher the LCV score the  
           representative will have. 
 
Constituent Ideology 
 Ideology is an important variable to examine because a significant portion of the 
literature on legislative voting focuses specifically on congressmen’s representation of their 
constituents’ ideologies. Moreover, although party and ideology seem to be equally influential on 
congressmen’s environmental attitudes, among citizens ideology appears to be a more important 
determinant than party (Kamieniecki 1995). In fact, Buttel reported that among constituents, 
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“indicators of political ideology have frequently been better predictors” of environmental 
concern than other measures (Buttel 1987).   
Researchers have consistently found liberals to demonstrate higher pro-environmental 
attitudes than conservatives. Although in this study the effect of each independent variable is 
examined individually, this should come as no surprise; Democrats, who also tend to be liberals, 
show greater environmental concern than do Republicans, who of course tend to be 
conservatives. As Kamieniecki (1995) pointed out, this is not always the case; however, this 
association is seen more often than not. Actually, the explanations for ideological voting offered 
by Van Liere and Dunlap are the same as those for party, which have already been discussed. 
The majority of pre-existing literature reports an association between ideology and 
environmentalist attitudes (Kamieniecki 1995). Kenski and Kenski (1981) found ideology to 
have a stronger relationship than partisanship with environmentalism, while Calvert (1979) 
found them equally influential; however, these authors, along with Dunlap and Allen (1976), all 
found a positive association between liberalism and environmental support (Kamieniecki 1995). 
Kraft (1995), Knuffman (1998), Shipan and Lowry (2001), and Theodori and Luloff (2002) also 
reported the same. 
 Operationalization: The percentage of constituents that voted for George Bush in the  
        2000 presidential election will be the measure of this variable. 
This measure has been chosen because, as Crowe and Eberspacher 
explained, Leogrande and Jeydel (1997) found “district presidential 
election results to be the best proxy for constituent ideology” (Crowe 
& Eberspacher 1998).  
Hypothesis 8: The more Democratic the district Presidential vote, the more supportive  
          of the environment the Representative will be. 
 
Data Analysis 
Model 
 In the study of legislative decision-making, there is a traditional methodology that 
researchers use. It is, explains Bishin, a regression that “characterizes models of legislator 
decision making with a dependent variable that represents a vote (or index of votes) and a series 
of independent variables for the factors held to influence these votes” (Bishin 2000). This 
“traditional model” was used in the current research project. As previously discussed, the 
measure of the dependent variable in this study is the LCV score. These scores are reported 
annually; therefore, separate regression models were run for each year. 
With the exception of seat changes, the only difference in the values of the independent 
variables for each of the regressions was seniority, which increased by one for all members who 
served in both the 108th and 109th Congresses. While in most cases regressions to examine the 
effects of different relationships were run, in some, data from only one year were used. The 
results proved to vary only slightly from year to year; thus, in cases where only one regression 
was run, the most recent data (2006) were used. 
In addition to the regression models, correlation diagnostics were run in order to check 
for collinearity between any of the independent variables. These results and a few noteworthy 
points regarding the dataset appear in the Appendix.  
Multiple Regressions 
The results of the regressions run with all independent variables are displayed in Table 2. 
The high and robust R squares of .827 (2003), .856 (2004), .847 (2005), and .833 (2006), indicate 
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that between approximately 83 and 86 percent of the variance in environmental support can be 
explained knowing the nine independent variables. There is clearly a very strong relationship 
between this combination of characteristics and environmental voting; however, only four show 
a statistically significant effect on the LCV scores. Party, district ideology, education level, and 
region (South) are all consistently significant at the .001 level. 
 An additional regression model was run for each year using only these four variables, the 
results of which are displayed in Table 3.  The R squares for these models - .824 (2003), .854 
(2004), .845 (2005), and .830 (2006), - differ only slightly from those in which all independent 
variables were included. While all nine variables together explain between 83 and 86 percent of 
the variance in LCV scores, the combination of party, district ideology, education level, and 
region (South) explains between approximately 82 and 85 percent of the variance. Just as every 
year the same four variables are statistically significant, they consistently appear in the same 
order of degree of influence (determined by the beta values): political party, district ideology, 
education, and region (South). 
Table 2 also reveals that while the results for the four significant variables are consistent, 
the results for the remaining five are not. Listed most to least influential, they appear as follows: 
occupation, intermountain West, seniority, urbanicity, and gender (2003); occupation, 
intermountain West, seniority, gender, and urbanicity (2004); gender, urbanicity, intermountain 
West, occupation, and seniority (2005); and intermountain West, gender, occupation, seniority, 
and urbanicity (2006). It is interesting to note that between the 108th and 109th Congresses, the 
sign for the beta value of urbanicity changes from positive to negative, while the sign for 
seniority does the opposite. 
The most important point, however, is that the findings regarding the effects of party, 
district ideology, education, and South are consistent in both sessions of Congresses. 
Relative Influence of Characteristics 
Models were run each year to test the separate effects of personal and constituency 
characteristics on legislators’ environmental support. This was done in order to compare the 
relative influence of these characteristics. 
 The results of the regressions for personal characteristics are displayed in Table 4.  Taken 
together, these three – gender, party, and seniority – explain between about 75 and 80 percent of 
the variance in LCV scores. Interestingly, in the models for the 108th Congress, while party 
remains significant at the .001 level, gender is also significant, although only at the .01 level. 
This is also the case for the models for the 109th Congress, but in addition, seniority is found to 
be significant at the .05 level. 
 Table 5 contains the results pertaining to constituency characteristics. These six – South, 
intermountain West, urbanicity, occupation, education level, and district ideology – explain 
between approximately 58 and 62 percent of the variance in environmental support. There are 
several important points to note. In all four models, district ideology remains statistically 
significant at the .001 level. Education also maintains significance, though it is at the .001 level 
in the first two years, at the .05 level in 2005, and at the .01 level in 2006. In addition, occupation 
meets statistical significance in two of the models - at the .01 level in 2003 and the .05 level in 
2004. Perhaps the most interesting difference, however, is that the South is not significant in any 
of these models. While one questions these changes in significance, such an analysis goes 
beyond the scope of this study. 
 According to the results presented in Tables 4 and 5, as one would reasonably expect, a 
legislator’s personal characteristics exert the greatest influence over his environmental voting. 
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However, his or her constituents’ characteristics, while not as influential, are clearly important as 
well.  The data support the assumption that legislators vote according to their constituents’ 
preferences, although they do not speak to whether this is for electoral or other reasons. 
Hypotheses 
It was predicted in Hypothesis 1 that the data would not show any statistically significant 
relationship between gender and LCV score, and the results support this hypothesis. In each of 
the four years studied, gender fails to have a significant influence on legislators’ environmental 
support. As an additional step, two more regressions were run, in order to determine whether 
gender has an interactive effect on legislators’ scores. The results are based on the data from 
2006 and are presented in Table 6. They reveal that the independent variables explain 
approximately 81 percent of the variance in the LCV scores of male representatives and about 93 
percent of the variance in the scores of the women. Among males, party, district ideology, 
education, and the South all remain statistically significant at the .001 level. Interestingly, among 
females, only party remains significant at this level. Moreover, while South is still significant, it 
is only at the .05 level, while education and district ideology are not significant at all. 
The results presented in Table 2 also support Hypothesis 2, which predicted that 
Democrats would be more environmentally supportive than Republicans. The relationship 
between party and LCV scores is positive and, as already stated, significant at the .001 level. 
With a beta value ranging from .669 and .734 over the four years, the results indicate that the 
political party of the legislator has the greatest impact on his environmental score. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that newer members in each party would have more extreme LCV 
scores than more senior members; thus, because the relationship predicted involves an 
interaction between party and seniority, two more regression models were run. The results, 
drawn from the 2006 data, are displayed in Table 7. For Democrats, although the relationship 
between seniority and LCV score is positive and strong (beta = .692), it is not statistically 
significant – the probability of chance occurrence is approximately 97 percent. Among 
Republicans, the relationship between seniority and LCV score is positive, weak (beta = .440), 
and has a probability of chance occurrence of about 15 percent. It is clear that the results do not 
support the hypothesis, for even when controlling for party, seniority remains an insignificant 
variable. 
The results presented in Table 7 contain several noteworthy findings, including that 
Democrats (R square = .479) appear more responsive than Republicans (R square = .325) to their 
constituents. In addition, while district ideology, education, and South remain statistically 
significant at the .001 level among Democrats, the situation for Republicans is quite different. 
Among Republicans, only ideology remains significant at the .001 level, although education is 
significant at the .05 level. Two additional variables meet statistical significance: urbanicity, 
which according to the beta value is more powerful than education, and intermountain West, 
both at the .05 level. 
The results in Table 2 only partially support Hypothesis 4, which predicted that 
representatives from the South and intermountain West would be the least supportive of 
environmental policies. The relationships between South and LCV score and between 
intermountain West and LCV score are both negative, which would appear to support the 
hypothesis; however, only the former is statistically significant. Region, therefore, does have an 
effect on the environmental support of legislators, but only when the South is compared with all 
other regions. With a beta value ranging from -.088 to -.100, the South is the fourth most 
influential factor on representatives’ LCV scores. 
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There is neither a statistically significant relationship between LCV scores and urbanicity 
nor between LCV scores and occupation (refer to Table 2). Therefore, Hypothesis 5, which 
predicted greater urbanicity to lead to greater environmental support, and Hypothesis 6, which 
predicted a greater percentage of blue-collar workers to lead to a lower LCV score, are neither 
confirmed nor rejected – the results are inconclusive. 
Table 2 also shows that district education level is the third most important characteristic 
in determining a legislator’s environmental voting score (beta ranges from .137 to .181). The 
results show that the higher the percentage of a representative’s constituents with college 
degrees, the higher his LCV score, indicating support for Hypothesis 7. There exists a positive 
and significant relationship between education level and environmental support. 
Revealing a negative and statistically significant relationship between district ideology 
and LCV score, the results presented in Table 2 also support Hypothesis 8. It appears, as was 
expected, that representatives who come from districts with a greater democratic presidential 
vote are more supportive of the environment. In each of the four models run, district ideology is 
the second most influential characteristic on legislative voting (beta ranging from -.209 to -.257). 
Summary 
The results of this study indicate that the greatest environmental support can be expected 
from Democrats, liberals, and individuals with college educations, while the least support can be 
expected from southern residents. While legislators are influenced by their personal 
characteristics and consider their own opinions, the results show that constituents’ characteristics 
are influential as well. 
The findings presented in this study are largely consistent with previous research. The 
same four variables significant in this investigation have been found to be significant in the past 
and the role of gender, perhaps one of the most debated topics, remains uncertain. The 
importance of seniority, urbanicity, and occupation, which have also been topics of debate, also 
remain unclear. 
Discussion 
One of the goals of this study was to determine what characteristics are significantly 
correlated with environmental support. It was consistently found that Democrats, liberals, and 
college graduates have the highest pro-environmental attitudes, while southerners have the 
lowest. It would appear then that efforts to recruit members to the environmentalist movement 
would be best invested if directed at southerners. Such an investment has the greatest potential 
for converting unlikely supporters. 
The more important goal of this study was to examine environmental issues in Congress. 
As previously mentioned, while most Americans do show support for environmental protection, 
this issue is not typically a significant factor in determining how they vote. This is especially true 
as the salience of environmental issues decreases, which it has since the 1970s. On September 
10, 2007, Harris Interactive asked 1,000 adults in the country, “What do you think are the two 
most important issues for the government to address?” According to the results, only 2 percent 
named the environment as one of the two. In comparison, the War, with 29 percent of the vote, 
received the highest support (Harris Interactive 2007). In light of these circumstances, because 
individuals are not expected to express any strong opinions on the issue, there would be no 
reason for congressmen to be preoccupied with their constituents’ preferences. This study found, 
however, that the democratic process of representation still works as it is expected to based upon 
the implications of traditional democratic theory. 
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One cannot deny that, together explaining between 83 and 85 percent of the variance in 
LCV scores, political party, district ideology, education level, and region (South) have a very 
strong influence over representatives’ environmental support. In addition, constituency 
characteristics alone were found to explain between 58 and 62 percent of the variance in LCV 
scores. Clearly then, legislators do consider their constituents’ environmental preferences. The 
fact that democracy continues to function even in the absence of an environmental crisis (which 
Coglianese suggested was necessary for increased issue salience) is very reassuring, and raises 
some important questions. 
As established by Shipan and Lowry (2001) as well as this study, the parties are 
obviously polarized over environmental policy, a trend which began after the 1970s. It is 
noteworthy that polarization has increased at the same time that issue salience has decreased. To 
what extent would an environmental crisis reverse this polarization? Immediately following the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the majority of Americans, regardless of political party, 
rallied behind the President. This unification did not last long, however, as the parties quickly 
diverged over the Iraq war. Would the same happen over an environmental crisis? After how 
long and what event would the parties, if at all, again begin to polarize? Would the window of 
opportunity following an environmental crisis be larger or smaller than that which existed after 
the terrorist attacks? 
It has been found by Clausen (1978) and others that the degree of polarization between 
Democrats and Republicans depends on the issue in question. What has also been found 
however, at least in the cases of the environment and terrorism, is that polarization also seems to 
be a factor of issue salience. It would be interesting to examine the relative influence on 
polarization of the actual issue itself as compared to its salience. 
In addition, while in response to the terrorist attacks the parties at first unified, as they 
presumably would in response to an environmental crisis, one wonders if there is any crisis that 
would cause an immediate polarization. Would there ever be a catastrophe which would cause 
the parties to immediately develop opposing responses? While it seems highly unlikely, if one 
were discovered, this would certainly merit scholarly attention. 
This discussion has focused on the effects of political party, as with a beta value ranging 
between .669 and .734 when run with all other variables - it is by far the most influential 
characteristic.  Questions can be asked about the other three significant characteristics as well. 
How would a crisis influence the significance of these variables? Would less educated 
individuals and southern residents show increased environmental support? Political party and 
ideology are highly correlated, therefore presumably as the parties converged, so would liberals 
and conservatives. For what other issues do party, ideology, education, and being a resident of 
the South significantly influence congressional voting? Are there issues for which any or all the 
five variables deemed insignificant in this study do have a significant influence on a legislator’s 
vote? 
Hopefully, this study can help structure the investigation of these and other questions 
regarding legislative voting. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 
Noteworthy Cases 
 Again, values for the independent variables were collected from the Almanac of 
American Politics, 2004, and CQ’s Politics in America, 2006, while LCV voter scores were 
collected from the organization’s website. There are a few important points to note about the 
dataset. 
First, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, representative for District 14 in Illinois, was 
excluded from all regressions. This is because, as the LCV states, “the Speaker of the House 
votes at his discretion” (“League of Conservation Voters,” 2007). 
Second, for District 48 in California, only data pertaining to Christopher Cox were used, 
although he was not given an LCV score in 2006. The LCV gave scores in 2005 and 2006 to 
John Campbell, but as this representative was not listed in either of the other two sources, he was 
excluded from the dataset. The same was also the case with District 50 in California, for which 
only data applicable to Randy ‘Duke’ Cunningham were entered. He was not given an LCV 
score in 2006, and although Brian Bilbray was, both almanacs listed Cunningham as the 
representative. 
 The three data sources provided somewhat conflicting information for District 2 in Ohio. 
Rob Portman is listed as the representative according to the Almanac of American Politics, and 
was given an LCV score each year except for 2006. The LCV gave a score in 2005 and 2006 to 
Jean Schmidt, but CQ’s Politics in America listed that the seat was vacant in the 109th Congress. 
Because of this confusion and the fact that Portman was only missing the 2006 LCV score, only 
he was included in the dataset. 
 The last adjustment to the dataset was made to District 19 in Texas. Randy Neugebauer 
was listed in both almanacs and was given an LCV score each year. Interestingly, the LCV 
scorecard also provided an LCV score in 2005 to Larry Combest. The scorecard is the only of the 
three sources to list Combest, however, and thus only data pertaining to Neugebauer was 
included. 
Correlations 
It is widely known that party and ideology are two highly correlated variables. In order to 
determine the degree of collinearity between these two as well as any other variables, a 
correlation matrix, using the data from 2006, was compiled and is displayed in Table 1. 
While numerous statistically significant correlations were found, only four were both 
significant and strong. Listed strongest to weakest, they are education and occupation (r = -.814), 
party and district ideology (r = -.675), urbanicity and occupation (r = -.627), and ideology and 
urbanicity (r = -.526). Each of these relationships is statistically significant at the .001 level. 
These results show strong correlations between having a lower education and being a blue-collar 
worker, living in a more conservative district and having a Republican representative in 
Congress, living in a more urbanized area and being more likely to have a blue-collar job, and 
between being a liberal and living in a more urbanized area. 
While at first it seemed surprising that party and ideology did not show the strongest 
correlation, this may be due to the fact that the measures reflect the party of the legislator but the 
ideology of his district. Moreover, while party is a dummy variable, ideology was measured as a 
percentage of a vote that was, as reported in The Almanac of American Politics, split three ways 
(Bush, Kerry, and Other). 
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Table 1 
Pearson Correlation Values (r) 
 
 Seniority South West Party District 
Ideology 
Urbanicity Education Occupation Gender 
Seniority 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
1 
 
435 
 
-.159*** 
.001 
435 
 
-.123** 
.010 
435 
 
.126** 
.009 
435 
 
-.156*** 
.001 
435 
 
.045 
.353 
435 
 
.044 
.361 
435 
 
-.054 
.264 
435 
 
.131** 
.006 
435 
South 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
-.159*** 
.001 
435 
 
1 
 
478 
 
-.187*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.108* 
.019 
477 
 
.349*** 
.000 
478 
 
 
-.226*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.162*** 
.000 
478 
 
.221*** 
.000 
478 
 
.094* 
.039 
477 
West 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
-.123** 
.010 
435 
 
-.187*** 
.000 
478 
 
1 
 
479 
 
-.100* 
.029 
477 
 
.113* 
.014 
478 
 
.041 
.370 
478 
 
 
.032 
.480 
478 
 
-.071 
.123 
478 
 
-.023 
.616 
477 
Party 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
.126** 
.009 
435 
 
-.108* 
.019 
477 
 
-.100* 
.029 
477 
 
1 
 
477 
 
-.675*** 
.000 
477 
 
.269*** 
.000 
477 
 
-.048 
.300 
477 
 
-.049 
.281 
477 
 
-.135** 
.003 
477 
District 
Ideology 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
-.156*** 
.001 
435 
 
.349*** 
.000 
478 
 
.113* 
.014 
478 
 
-.675*** 
.000 
477 
 
1 
 
478 
 
-.526*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.087 
.056 
478 
 
.249*** 
.000 
478 
 
.218*** 
.000 
477 
Urbanicity 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
.045 
.353 
435 
 
-.226*** 
.000 
478 
 
.041 
.370 
478 
 
.269*** 
.000 
477 
 
-.526*** 
.000 
478 
 
1 
 
478 
 
.447*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.627*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.222*** 
.000 
477 
Education 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
.044 
.361 
435 
 
-.162*** 
.000 
478 
 
.032 
.480 
478 
 
-.048 
.300 
477 
 
-.087 
.056 
478 
 
.447*** 
.000 
478 
 
1 
 
478 
 
-.814*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.102* 
.026 
477 
Occupation 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
-.054 
.264 
435 
 
.221*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.071 
.123 
478 
 
-.049 
.281 
477 
 
.249*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.627*** 
.000 
478 
 
-.814*** 
.000 
478 
 
1 
 
478 
 
.099* 
.031 
477 
Gender 
        r 
       Sig. 
       N 
 
.131** 
.006 
435 
 
.094* 
.039 
477 
 
-.023 
.616 
477 
 
-.135** 
.003 
477 
 
.218*** 
.000 
477 
 
-.222*** 
.000 
477 
 
-.102* 
.026 
477 
 
.099* 
.031 
477 
 
1 
 
477 
 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
***Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 2 
The Effects of All Independent Variables* 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Model Summary 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
2003      .910 .827 .824 16.624 
Party** 53.589 2.284 .676 23.461 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.718 .097 -.257 -7.378 .000     
Education** .785 .160 .181 4.917 .000     
South** -8.442 1.929 -.100 -4.377 .000     
Occupation .443 .258 .072 1.716 .087     
Intermountain 
West 
-6.753 3.456 -.042 -1.954 .051     
Seniority -.210 .214 -.021 -.986 .325     
Urbanicity .021 .059 .011 .354 .724     
Gender -.951 2.432 -.008 -.391 .696     
          
2004      .925 .856 .853 15.426 
Party** 56.794 2.115 .705 26.856 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.710 .090 -.250 -7.863 .000     
Education** .717 .148 .162 4.831 .000     
South** -7.782 1.796 -.091 -4.334 .000     
Occupation .392 .240 .062 1.634 .103     
Intermountain 
West 
-5.960 3.210 -.036 -1.857 .064     
Seniority -.155 .198 -.015 -.781 .435     
Gender -1.112 2.256 -.010 -.493 .622     
Urbanicity .018 .055 .009 .317 .752     
          
2005      .920 .847 .843 15.677 
Party** 58.162 2.182 .734 26.651 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.584 .092 -.209 -6.336 .000     
Education** .594 .150 .137 3.955 .000     
South** -7.413 1.817 -.088 -4.080 .000     
Gender -3.031 2.177 -028 -1.392 .165     
Urbanicity -.050 .056 -.025 -.885 .377     
Intermountain 
West 
-3.504 3.249 -.022 -1.078 .282     
Occupation .131 .242 .021 .543 .587     
Seniority .102 .197 .010 .519 .604     
          
2006      .913 .833 .830 16.272 
Party** 52.755 2.266 .669 23.280 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.709 .096 -.255 -7.385 .000     
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Education** .715 .156 .164 4.575 .000     
South** -8.290 1.891 -.099 -4.384 .000     
Intermountain 
West 
-6.569 3.378 -.041 -1.945 .052     
Gender -4.051 2.264 -.038 -1.789 .074     
Occupation .207 .252 .034 .824 .411     
Seniority .155 .204 .016 .758 .449     
Urbanicity -.025 .058 -.013 -.426 .670     
*With a significance value of .000, all models are statistically significant at the .001 level 
** Variable is statistically significant at the .001 level 
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Table 3 
Effects of the Four Significant Variables* 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Model Summary 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
2003      .908 .824 .822 16.690 
Party** 53.852 2.268 .680 23.745 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.716 .085 -.256 -8.469 .000     
Education** .556 .090 .128 6.180 .000     
South** -7.314 1.864 -.087 -3.925 .000     
          
2004      .924 .854 .852 15.467 
Party** 58.861 2.082 .706 27.307 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.716 .078 -.252 -9.219 .000     
Education** .514 .083 .116 6.165 .000     
South** -6.714 1.727 -.078 -3.888 .000     
          
2005      .919 .845 .844 15.668 
Party** 58.465 2.164 .738 27.013 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.563 .080 -.201 -7.012 .000     
Education** .487 .085 .112 5.761 .000     
South** -7.108 1.738 -.084 -4.090 .000     
          
2006      .911 .830 .828 16.347 
Party** 53.018 2.259 .672 23.469 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.718 .084 -.258 -8.552 .000     
Education** .590 .089 .135 6.615 .000     
South** -7.608 1.817 -.091 -4.187 .000     
 
*With a significance value of .000, all models are statistically significant at the .001 level 
**Variable is statistically significant at the .00l level 
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Table 4 
Effects of Personal Characteristics* 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Model Summary 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
2003      .865 .748 .746 19.961 
Party** 67.399 1.952 .851 34.531 .000     
Gender*** -8.012 2.812 -.070 -2.849 .005     
Seniority .190 .251 .019 .758 .449     
          
2004      .886 .786 .784 18.722 
Party** 70.329 1.830 .873 38.433 .000     
Gender*** -7.962 2.637 -.069 -3.019 .003     
Seniority .233 .235 .022 .990 .323     
          
2005      .891 .795 .793 18.011 
Party** 69.098 1.768 .872 39.079 .000     
Gender*** -7.593 2.429 -.070 -3.126 .002     
Seniority**** .509 .220 .052 2.313 .021     
          
2006      .870 .756 .755 19.523 
Party** 66.490 1.926 .843 34.531 .000     
Gender** -9.830 2.634 -.091 -3.732 .000     
Seniority*** .640 .239 .065 2.678 .008     
 
*With a significance value of .000, all models are statistically significant at the .001 level 
**Variable is statistically significant at the .001 level 
***Variable is statistically significant at the .01 level 
****Variable is statistically significant at the .05 level  
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Table 5 
Effects of Constituency Characteristics* 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Model Summary 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta T Sig. R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
2003      .777 .603 .598 25.115 
District 
Ideology** 
-2.217 .110 -.793 -20.223 .000     
Education** .933 .239 .215 3.899 .000     
Occupation*** .996 .384 .161 2.591 .010     
Intermountain 
West 
-4.516 5.155 -.028 -.876 .381     
Urbanicity -.046 .089 -.023 -.514 .607     
South -.678 2.849 -.008 -.238 .812     
          
2004      .781 .609 .604 25.329 
District 
Ideology** 
-2.295 .111 -.808 -20.765 .000     
Education** .867 .241 .196 3.592 .000     
Occupation**** .944 .388 .150 2.434 .015     
Urbanicity -.066 .089 -.033 -.734 .463     
Intermountain 
West 
-3.996 5.199 -.024 -.769 .442     
South .514 2.873 .006 .179 .858     
          
2005      .766 .587 .582 25.623 
District 
Ideology** 
-2.225 .112 -.796 -19.893 .000     
Education**** .609 .244 .140 2.494 .013     
Occupation .503 .392 .081 1.282 .201     
Urbanicity -.125 .091 -.063 -1.382 .168     
South -1.366 2.907 -.016 -.470 .639     
Intermountain 
West 
-.368 5.259 -.002 -.070 .944     
          
2006      .784 .615 .610 24.635 
District 
Ideology** 
-2.202 .108 -.790 -20.332 .000     
Education*** .744 .235 .171 3.163 .002     
Occupation .565 .378 .091 1.494 .136     
Urbanicity -.087 .087 -.044 -.998 .319     
South -2.965 2.804 -.035 -1.058 .291     
Intermountain 
West 
-3.875 5.065 -.024 -.765 .445     
*With a significance value of .000, all models are statistically significant at the .001 level 
**Variable is statistically significant at the .001 level 
***Variable is statistically significant at the .01 level 
****Variable is statistically significant at the .05 level 
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Table 6 
Effects of All Variables, Controlling for Gender* 
(Based on data from 2006) 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Model Summary 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Males      .901 .812 .808 16.891 
Party** 50.885 2.547 .657 19.982 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.789 .109 -.283 -7.253 .000     
Education** .802 .175 .183 4.574 .000     
South** -7.675 2.127 -.095 -3.608 .000     
Urbanicity -.087 .066 -.045 -1.312 .190     
Intermountain 
West 
-6.817 3.879 -.043 -1.757 .080     
Occupation .115 .282 .019 .407 .684     
Seniority .133 .221 .014 .604 .546     
          
Females      .965 .931 .921 11.001 
Party** 64.754 4.609 .802 14.051 .000     
District 
Ideology 
-.254 .168 -.093 -1.511 .136     
South*** -7.472 3.674 -.081 -2.034 .047     
Education .264 .309 .069 .855 .396     
Urbanicity .155 .127 .062 1.224 .226     
Seniority .858 .550 .058 1.558 .125     
Intermountain 
West 
-3.620 5.398 -.025 -.671 .505     
Occupation .124 .509 .020 .244 .808     
 
*With a significance value of .000, the model is statistically significant at the .001 level 
**Variable is statistically significant at the .001 level 
***Variable is statistically significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7 
Effects of All Variables, Controlling for Party*  
(Based on data from 2006) 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
   
Model Summary 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Democrats      .692 .479 .457 15.057 
Education** .884 .209 .438 4.234 .000     
South** -14.149 2.724 -.303 -5.194 .000     
District 
Ideology** 
-.461 .121 -.280 -3.824 .000     
Occupation .647 .346 .211 1.869 .063     
Urbanicity .144 .079 .140 1.827 .069     
Gender -3.842 2.776 -.078 -1.384 .168     
Intermountain 
West 
6.129 5.615 .058 1.091 .276     
Seniority .010 .261 .002 .039 .969     
          
Republicans      .570 .325 .300 16.237 
District 
Ideology** 
-1.181 .170 -.448 -6.953 .000     
Urbanicity*** -.207 .091 -.198 -2.265 .024     
Education*** .456 .227 .188 2.009 .046     
Occupation -.461 .359 -.145 -1.285 .200     
Intermountain 
West*** 
-9.499 4.125 -.139 -2.303 .022     
Seniority .440 .304 .083 1.445 .150     
South -1.829 2.590 -.046 -.706 .481     
Gender -.485 3.563 -.008 -.136 .892     
 
*With a significance value of .000, the model is statistically significant at the .001 level 
**Variable is statistically significant at the .001 level 
***Variable is statistically significant at the .05 level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
